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The International Criminal Court in Africa 
 
Jonathan Hobson  
 
Introduction  
 
Entering into force on 1 July 2002, the Rome Statue established the International Criminal Court (ICC) with 
jurisdiction over ‘the most serious crimes of concern to the international community’: genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes (ICC, 2002: 3). It is not the purpose of this chapter to explore the differences 
between these crimes, for such there are many detailed accounts that explain the distinctive and the 
circumstances in which they occur. For instance, Lemkin’s (1944) essay originating the concept of genocide is 
important for understanding the basis of the act, and works from Schabas (2008), Totten and Bartrop (2009), 
Jones (2011) and Stanton (2016) contribute important interpretations of the crime. In terms of the links 
between genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, Bauman (2009), Shaw (2003, 2015), and Geras 
(2015) offer useful insights into broader social concepts of modernity and racism.  
This chapter is concerned with the way in which the ICC has been conducting its work in Africa, and it 
does this in four parts. The first part details key aspects of the legislation underpinning the ICC and outlines 
some of the criticisms of the ICC’s conduct in Africa. The second part explores the difficult relationships the 
court has with the African Union, discussing the impacts of this for the effective working of the ICC on the 
continent. The third part examines debates around the ICC’s wider impact, particularly on states transitioning 
from violence. The chapter concludes with a short discussion on the future for the ICC in Africa, outlining 
some potential solutions to the difficulties it faces.  
 
The International Criminal Court and its conduct in Africa  
 
Although international legislation regarding serious abuses of human rights is relatively recent, the acts that 
constitute those crimes are not. Human history is full of incidences of widespread violence, destruction and 
the inflicting of intentional suffering. The ICC was an international response to this: a statement that there are 
some crimes so significant that, in the words of the Rome Statute, they ‘shock the conscience of humanity’ 
(ICC, 2002: 1). 
The Rome Statute is a detailed document, establishing the ICC as a global legislative body with an 
international reach. For the purposes of this chapter, there are four significant clauses that relate to the ICC’s 
work and the criticisms the court faces in Africa. First, the ICC is a court of last resort that works on a 
principle of complementarity, in other words, that it is first and foremost ‘the duty of every State to exercise 
its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes’ (ICC, 2002: 1). The ICC will only 
intervene where ‘the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’ (ICC, 
2002: 12). Second, states that have ratified the Rome Statute have a requirement to extradite to the ICC those 
on trial for crimes under its jurisdiction. Importantly, this requirement applies regardless of a defendant’s 
position, as stated in Article 27: ‘Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official 
capacity of a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its 
jurisdiction over such a person’ (ICC, 2002: 18).  
Third, although initially formed by the United Nations, the ICC is intended to be an independent and 
politically neutral body. It is managed by an Assembly of States Parties comprising representatives of the 
states that have ratified or acceded to the Rome Statute. It is funded by a contribution model similar to the UN 
in which contributions are based roughly on member states’ GDP. There are 18 judges, elected by the 
Assembly of States Parties for nine-year terms, and currently those judges are from Argentina, the Dominican 
Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Nigeria, 
Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Czech Republic, France, Poland, Germany, Hungary, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (ICC, 2016a). The ICC initiates investigations in three ways: on the basis of a referral from 
the UN Security Council; from a petition by a state party or by a state not part of the Rome Statute that 
accepts the ICC jurisdiction in the case; or through an investigation initiated by the ICC’s Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) (ICC, 2016b: 17).  
One hundred and twenty-four countries are parties to the Rome Statute, including 34 African states, many 
of whom were among the first to ratify the legislation. Table 48.1 shows African states that are members, 
along with their dates of ratification.  
 
Table 48.1 African states party to the Rome Statute of the ICC  
 
State            Date of ratification 
  
Senegal, Ghana           1999  
Mali, Lesotho, Botswana, Sierra Leone, Gabon, South Africa      2000  
Nigeria, Central African Republic         2001  
Benin, Mauritius, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Uganda, Namibia,    2002  
Gambia, United Republic of Tanzania, Malawi, Djibouti, Zambia  
Guinea            2003  
Burkina Faso, Congo, Burundi, Liberia        2004  
Kenya            2005  
Comoros           2006  
Chad            2007  
Madagascar           2008  
Seychelles           2010  
Tunisia, Cape Verde          2011  
Côte d’Ivoire           2013  
 
Source: African Union (2015a). 
 
Although, as Boehme (2017: 56) puts it, ‘African countries were deeply involved in creating the Court and 
all its provisions’, it is fair to say that the ICC has a fractious relationship with many of these states. One of 
the most significant and persistent critiques is that the court ‘has preoccupied itself with Africa and failed to 
investigate equally severe conflicts elsewhere’ (Bassiouni and Hansen, 2014). At its most extreme, proponents 
of this position argue that the ICC is one element of a neocolonial project focused on Africa.  
Abdul Tejan-Cole, Executive Director of the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), explains 
how conflict over the role and perceptions of the ICC in Africa has led some to go so far as ‘to accuse the 
Court of being a neo-colonialist institution peddling a Western agenda that seeks to control African politics 
through ICC investigations and prosecutions’ (Tejan-Cole, 2014). Similarly, in a 2012 opinion piece, 
Courtenay Griffiths, the lead defense attorney for former Liberian President Charles Taylor, argued that:  
 
The requirement of international justice is not the raison d’être of the International Criminal 
Court at all. Instead, the court acts as a vehicle for its primarily European funders, of which the 
UK is one of the largest, to exert their power and influence, particularly in Africa.  
(Griffiths, 2012)  
 
Associated with arguments of a neocolonialist agenda, although less critical in interpretation, are claims of 
selectivism when the ICC decides on which cases to prosecute. Knoops (2014: 325), for instance, describes 
how the ‘Achilles heel of the ICC system revolves around the fairness of its selection process of its cases’. 
There are a number of factors influencing whether or not the ICC pursues a particular case, and the referral 
processes are clearly established in the Rome Statute. However, it is certainly true that, as with most criminal 
justice systems, the ICC do not have the resources to prosecute every individual involved in a particular case. 
In their own words:  
 
The Court will not be able to bring to justice every person suspected of committing crimes of 
concern to the international community. The prosecutorial policy of the Office of the Prosecutor 
is to focus its investigations and prosecutions on those who, having regard to the evidence 
gathered, bear the greatest responsibility for such crimes.  
(ICC, 2016b: 17)  
 
The criticism is that selectivism extends beyond decisions within cases to decisions about which cases the ICC 
should prosecute. As a consequence, the concern is that geopolitical pressures mean that cases in Africa are 
more likely to be pursued. For Imoedemhe (2015: 80), it effectively means that ‘international crimes are 
ignored when it is considered politically expedient to do so’.  
At the other end of the debate are those such as Keppler (2012: 8), who claims that the ‘characterization of 
the ICC as unfairly targeting Africans is not supported by the facts’. deGuzman (2014) makes a similar case, 
arguing that ‘all of the Court’s actions to date have been based on plausible interpretations of the relevant 
law’. The foundation of this position is the central importance of complementarity in the Rome Statue: in 
other words, that the ICC is only able to open cases when national governments are failing to investigate 
crimes in a comprehensive manner. As a consequence of this, any claims that there is an undue focus on one 
region ‘are based on misunderstandings about the extent of the ICC’s jurisdiction’ (deGuzman, 2014). It is not 
that those taking this position ignore the distribution of ICC prosecutions in Africa, but they contend that this 
clustering is a consequence of ‘the current situation of the African continent, with its wars and poverty, have 
as their root cause the impunity that thrives in a lack of accountability and the rule of law’ (Wilson, 2008: 
114).  
Whether driven by neocolonialism, politically motivated selectivism or by the demands of procedural 
justice, as Table 48.2 shows it is clear that the ICC has undertaken the largest portion of its work in situations 
relating to African states.  
 
Table 48.2 ICC legal action up to April 2017  
 
Africa         Asia          Europe North America    South America  
 
Investigations not taken to preliminary  0       1           0   1        1 
examination  
Situations currently under investigation  9       0           1   0        0  
Investigations taken to preliminary   4       2           3 (*) (**)  0        1  
examination  
In trial or appeal      5       0          0   0        0  
Cases closed or defendant found not   5       0           0   0        0 
guilty  
Successful prosecutions (***)    4       0           0   0        0  
 
Source: ICC (2017a).  
 
Notes:  
 
(*) Refers to investigation into alleged war crimes committed by United Kingdom nationals in the context of the Iraq 
conflict and occupation from 2003 to 2008.  
(**) Refers to case opened by Comoros in respect to the 31 May 2010 Israeli raid on the humanitarian aid flotilla bound 
for the Gaza Strip.  
(***) Includes convictions in appeal. 
 
 
The ICC and the African Union  
 
The African Union have been one of the most consistent critics of the ICC’s work in Africa. This came to a 
head in 2009, when the ICC issued a second arrest warrant for Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, adding 
genocide to the existing charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The African Union responded at 
its July 2010 summit, calling on its members not to cooperate with the ICC arrest warrant. Later that year, al-
Bashir visited Chad and Kenya, both of which are signatories to the Rome Statute of the ICC, and both 
refused to arrest and extradite al-Bashir.  
The 2010 summit of the African Union was also significant as the African Union rejected a request by the 
ICC to open a liaison office in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. This was accompanied by a series of inflammatory 
comments directed to Luis Moreno-Ocampo, the first ICC Chief Prosecutor, whom they accused of ‘making 
egregiously unacceptable, rude and condescending statement[s]’ (Keppler, 2012: 3). These comments reflect a 
long-standing animosity from the African Union towards Moreno-Ocampo, whom they felt was guilty of 
‘failing to communicate with his African interlocutors, particularly by failing to partake in discussions with 
the AU’ (du Plessis et al, 2016: 2). Indeed, this relationship was so bad that in 2011, Jean Ping, then chairman 
of the African Union, said, ‘frankly speaking, we are not against the ICC. What we are against is Ocampo’s 
justice’ (BBC, 2011).  
Regardless of the drivers for the animosity between the African Union and Moreno-Ocampo, it is clear that 
from the outset, there were significant tensions between the ICC and the African Union. In order to try to 
overcome these difficulties, between 2012 and 2014, a series of African Union-International Criminal Court 
(AU-ICC) Joint Seminars were held, the purpose of which was to bring together:  
 
ICC experts, AU Commission staff, as well as Ambassadors and legal advisors of the 
Permanent Missions of the African Union Member States in Addis Ababa [in order to] facilitate 
dialogue and provide an opportunity for frank and open discussions between the ICC and the 
AU, with a view to fostering understanding of the respective mandates of the two institutions, 
discussing issues of mutual interest and strengthening the relationship between the two 
institutions.  
(African Union, 2015b)  
 
While this series of seminars was taking place, on 12 October 2013 at an extraordinary session in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, the African Union produced a ‘Decisions and Declarations’ document on their relationship 
with the ICC, reiterating the:  
 
AU’s concern on the politicization and misuse of indictments against African leaders by ICC as 
well as at the unprecedented indictments of and proceedings against the sitting President and 
Deputy President of Kenya in light of the recent developments in that country.  
(African Union, 2013: 1)  
 
In particular, the African Union expressed concern over the two ongoing cases regarding President al-Bashir 
in Sudan, and President Uhuru Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto in Kenya. In both 
countries, the African Union contested ICC prosecutions on the grounds that they were a misuse of 
international jurisdiction and that, particularly in the case of Kenya, were a threat to ‘the process of addressing 
the challenges leading to the post-election violence’ (African Union, 2013: 1).  
As part of the 2013 extraordinary session, the African Union also reaffirmed its support of national and 
internal law that grants immunity to heads of state and senior officials while in office, stating that ‘no charges 
shall be commenced or continued before any International Court or Tribunal against any serving AU Head of 
State or Government’ (African Union, 2013: 2). Furthermore, a request was made at the extraordinary session 
that ‘any AU Member State that wishes to refer a case to the ICC may inform and seek the advice of the 
African Union’ (African Union, 2013: 3). This move echoed an earlier draft protocol from the African Union 
that called for the expansion of the African courts to cover human rights abuses, including those crimes 
currently associated with the ICC (African Union, 2012: 17). For Abbas (2013: 934), such a prospect 
‘portends some troubling times for the International Criminal Court (ICC), but more so for international 
criminal justice in Africa’.  
The African Union is not the only group to question the mandate of the ICC. The requirement to extradite 
and the removal of political immunity remains one of the most controversial aspects of the ICC’s work. For 
instance, the United States of America also expresses serious concerns over the potential for politicised 
decision-making in the ICC: ‘The Rome Statute creates a self-initiating prosecutor, answerable to no state or 
institution other than the Court itself. Without such an external check on the prosecutor, there is insufficient 
protection against politicized prosecutions or other abuses’ (US State Department, 2003). Unlike many 
members of the African Union, however, the United States has not ratified the Rome Statute: it was the 
ratification and subsequent refusal to extradite that has had the most significant impact on the authority of the 
ICC. 
In 2015, the African Union’s Committee of African Ministers on International Criminal Court reiterated 
their commitment to suspending or deferring the proceedings against al-Bashir, with a mind to ultimately 
withdrawing the case. This was accompanied by a request to ‘terminate or suspend the proceedings against 
Deputy President William Samoei Ruto of Kenya until the African concerns and proposals for amendments of 
the Rome Statute of the ICC are considered’ (African Union, 2015c). These continued calls have had a 
significant impact, as since the initial arrest warrant in 2009, al-Bashir has visited eight African states that are 
signatories to the Rome Statute of the ICC: Chad, Kenya, Djibouti, Malawi, Nigeria, the DRC, South Africa 
and Uganda (Boehme, 2017: 51).  
Although the anti-ICC rhetoric from the African Union has been persistent, there has not been a universal 
acquiescence to the African Union’s positions. Many states find themselves torn between the two bodies. For 
instance, Boehme (2017: 52) describes how the African Union’s demand for non-compliance in the arrest of 
Omar al-Bashir ‘catapulted the South African executive into a loyalty conflict between its obligation to the 
African Union and its obligation to the ICC’. This conflict was played out in South Africa’s Supreme Court of 
Appeals, which ruled that the government were in breach of their ICC obligations for failing to extradite al-
Bashir during his 2015 visit. As a response to this ruling, in October 2016 the South African government 
issued an instrument of withdrawal from the ICC, citing that it had ‘found its obligations, with respect to the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts, at times incompatible with the interpretation given by the ICC’ (South 
African Government News Agency, 2016). This decision was again challenged in South Africa’s High Court, 
which in 2017 ruled that without first seeking parliamentary approval, the move was ‘unconstitutional and 
invalid’ (BBC, 2017). In March 2017, the South African government formally revoked their withdrawal from 
the ICC (Mail & Guardian, 2017).  
There is an argument to be made around the degree to which the African Union offers a unified voice for 
African states. For instance, Keppler (2012: 5) claims that the African Union ‘does not reflect the range of 
positions that African governments have regarding the ICC’. For Keppler (2012: 7), a significant part of the 
pushback to the ICC in Africa comes from a targeted effort by a group of African Union members that have 
not ratified the Rome Statute and have ‘actively sought to exploit unevenness in the application of 
international justice to present the ICC as a new form of imperialism that should be opposed’. du Plessis et al. 
(2016: 11) take a similar position, claiming that:  
 
the tendency by some on the AU side to paint the ICC as a tool of Western imperialism and as a 
neo-colonial project out to get Africa is misplaced and undermines the genuine support and 
commitment that almost two-thirds of the AU member states have demonstrated by ratifying the 
Rome Statute.  
 
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the ICC has had, and continues to have, a good level of support 
across Africa. For instance, the critical messages delivered by the July 2010 African Union summit were by 
no means universally supported. Several members had ‘actively sought a far more favourable text that 
excluded the call for non-cooperation and criticism of the prosecutor’s conduct’ (Keppler, 2012: 5). Although 
this declaration was ultimately included, a clause which called for sanctions on states that continued to 
cooperate with the ICC was not. Following the release of the declaration, several member states publicly 
distanced themselves from the censure of the ICC, including Botswana and South Africa (although as the 
above shows, that support was relatively short-lived from the South African government). 
Further support for the ICC was voiced in the aftermath of South Africa’s 2016 proposed withdrawal, 
when a number of African Union members publicly backed the court and its work in Africa. This included 
Nigeria, the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Botswana, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Burkina Faso, Tanzania, Lesotho and 
Uganda (Human Rights Watch, 2016a).  
The ICC also enjoys significant support from civil society groups and organisations, many of which have 
‘repeatedly collaborated on letters, analyses and meetings with officials of African ICC states parties to 
convey the need for strong African government support for the ICC’ (Keppler, 2012: 19). In a 2016 open 
letter to members of the African Union, 200 civil society groups from across Africa wrote to states that are 
both African Union and ICC members. The open letter urged these states to publicly affirm their support for 
the court, and to increase their involvement with ICC activities in Africa and beyond (Human Rights Watch, 
2016b).  
The ICC and transitional states  
 
Another area of the ICC’s involvement in Africa that has come under scrutiny is its work in states that are 
transitioning from periods of significant conflict. These transitional states often face difficult challenges as 
they seek to rebuild political and social structures while overcoming the psychological and cultural impacts of 
violence.  
For authors such as Okafor and Ngwaba (2015), there has been an overemphasis on the ICC as the route 
for achieving justice in the face of grave abuses of human rights. This overemphasis is, at least in part, due to 
an orthodoxy in international approaches that are ‘ICC-centric’, and which ‘consciously or unconsciously 
advocates the use of the ICC far more robustly in Africa than has ever been done on any other continent’ 
(Okafor and Ngwaba, 2015: 92). Such an approach to managing grave and historic abuses, they argue, fails to 
take into account the needs of societies transitioning from violence. They have four main criticisms.  
First, Okafor and Ngwaba (2015) question the long-term impact of an international jurisdictional approach 
that bypasses a state’s domestic justice system. They highlight the:  
 
possible negative consequences of the significant displacement or circumvention of local 
criminal justice institutions that occurs with the utilization of international criminal justice in 
situations where past crimes fall within the categories of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes.  
(Okafor and Ngwaba, 2015: 96)  
 
Similar criticisms have been levelled at the precursors to the ICC. For instance, Barria and Roper (2005) 
discuss the efficacy of the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, particularly 
their ability to maintain peace, provide justice and move towards national reconciliation. Indeed, they argue 
that it was some of these failings in the latter two tribunals that drove the creation of the ICC.  
Chief Charles Achaleke Taku, a Lead Counsel for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Special 
Court for Sierra Leone, and for the ICC, echoes criticisms of the ICC’s ability to provide longer-term positive 
impacts in Africa. He argues that there is a risk that the court’s approach towards Africa could be 
‘destabilizing and insensitive to other avenues put in place by the AU to provide African solutions to African 
problems’ (Taku, 2014). To be effective in providing longer-term benefits to transitional states and to develop 
wider support with bodies such as the African Union, Taku (2014) argues that the ‘ICC must be sensitive to 
the presence of other conflict management and conflict resolution actors in the field in Africa’. In making his 
case, Taku points to the truth and reconciliation processes that have formed significant parts of transitional 
contexts in Africa for a number of years. These were arguably most effective in Sierra Leone, but also played 
significant roles in post-apartheid South Africa and the Gacaca community court system used after the 
genocide in Rwanda.  
Second, Okafor and Ngwaba (2015) identify the potential dangers of politicised justice delivered by 
international institutions. They argue that the international community is not consistent in its approach to 
achieving justice, particularly in states transitioning from conflict. To some extent, this should be expected, as 
the context in which conflicts occur and end are very different, although Okafor and Ngwaba (2015: 97) 
question whether ‘a version of transitional justice tends to be despatched to weaker or less favoured states 
(many of which are in Africa), as opposed to their stronger or more favoured counterparts (most of which are 
not African)?’ Claims of a politicised and inconsistent approach reflects many of the criticisms levied at the 
ICC from parts of the African Union. Boehme (2017: 52) argues that, in line with many member states such as 
South Africa, the African Union has ‘a preference for regional solutions to regional conflicts, for quiet over 
antagonistic diplomacy toward autocratic regimes and for an anti-imperialist world order in which the global 
south enjoys equal status to the global north’.  
Third, Okafor and Ngwaba (2015) problematise an approach sometimes taken by the international 
community whereby guarantees of impunity are given to certain combatants or groups in order for them to 
cease fighting. The example they give is of the DRC, in which approximately 330,000 fighters were given 
guarantees of impunity in order to expedite the end of the conflict (Okafor and Ngwaba, 2015). While this 
might be a realist approach that takes into account the problems of managing a transition from conflict to 
peace, it is unlikely, Okafor and Ngwaba (2015: 98) argue, to ‘have a deterrent effect against such crimes in 
the future’.  
Although it is true that the international community might negotiate peace deals that involve an element of 
immunity, it is also important to note that the first case the ICC opened was in the DRC, investigating ‘alleged 
war crimes and crimes against humanity committed mainly in eastern DRC, in the Ituri region and the North 
and South Kivu Provinces, [committed] since 1 July 2002’ (ICC, 2017b). The ICC’s first two convictions 
were also from the DRC: Lubanga Dyilo, found guilty for the war crime of enlisting and using child soldiers 
and sentenced to 14 years in 2012; and Germain Katanga, found guilty for one count of a crime against 
humanity (murder) and four counts of war crimes (murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of 
property and pillaging) and sentenced to 20 years in 2013 (ICC, 2017b). Other cases in the DRC include the 
ongoing trial of Bosco Ntaganda, alleged deputy chief of the FPLC, charged with five counts of crimes against 
humanity and 13 counts of war crimes; the acquittal of Ngudjolo Chui of charges of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity; and the outstanding arrest warrant for Sylvestre Mudacumura on nine counts of war crimes 
(ICC, 2017b).  
As a counterpoint, Abbas (2013: 946) argues that it is precisely because of the instability in transitional 
states or states in conflict that the ICC should play a role in offering a path to justice. It is often unrealistic to 
suppose that those who are ‘shielded by the deployment of raw political force’ are able to be held to account 
by national political institutions:  
 
If there is any serious lesson to be learned from the cat-and-mouse game of the Ugandan regime 
and the LRA before the referral of the case to the ICC, it is precisely that domestic justice may 
not be suitable where potential culprits have as much or even more fire power than the state, or 
where the government is itself morally compromised.  
(Abbas, 2013: 946) 
 
Finally, Okafor and Ngwaba (2015) argue that it is difficult to apply effective justice in situations where 
conflict is ongoing, where a fragile post-conflict state remains influenced by an incumbent or outgoing 
regime, or where a recently militarised group still holds some level of influence and control. In these 
circumstances, what they describe as the ‘international criminal justice-laden and ICC-heavy approaches 
generally adopted in recent years on the African continent’ (Okafor and Ngwaba, 2015: 99) may serve to 
entrench rather than challenge support for those accused of grave human rights abuses. This might, at least in 
part, be a driver for some of the anti-ICC sentiment that Keppler (2012) identifies as being present in parts of 
the African Union.  
Although there are some criticisms of the role of the ICC in transitional states, that does not mean there are 
no benefits to this type of international criminal justice approach. There is a growing body of evidence 
suggesting that the impact of the ICC goes beyond formal prosecutions. For instance, Bassiouni and Hansen 
(2014) argue that the ‘ICC is an institution with the capacity to change habits and outcomes’. Equally, Hyeran 
and Simmons (2016: 444) present the work of the ICC as more nuanced than its record of prosecutions, 
identifying ‘multiple mechanisms – legal and social, international and domestic – associated with the ICC’s 
authority that can potentially deter law violation in countries prone to civil violence’. In particular, they 
identify two potential forms of mutually reinforcing deterrents to which the ICC contributes: prosecution 
deterrent, both from its own Investigatory powers and its wider impact on domestic laws, and social 
deterrence from the mobilisation of the international community and domestic civil society (Hyeran and 
Simmons, 2016: 469).  
Broache (2016) supports the idea that interpretations of the ICC’s impact should be more circumspect, 
arguing that the impact of intervention can vary depending on a range of factors, including the nature of 
conflict at the time of intervention. Through a statistical analysis of ICC action during the conflict in the DRC, 
he demonstrates ‘variation in the effects of prosecutions across stages of the legal process and other relevant 
categories such as belligerent groups, conflict situations and time’ (Broache, 2016: 408). Although careful to 
point out that this is based on one case study area, the study does demonstrate that the ICC’s involvement in 
Africa is neither wholly positive nor wholly negative.  
 
 
The future of the ICC in Africa  
 
There are those such as Abbas (2013: 946) who argue that the relationship between the ICC and the African 
Union ‘was a disaster waiting to happen’. This is particularly evident in the case of al-Bashir, around which 
Boehme (2017: 69) argues that the African Union succeeded in creating a ‘non-cooperation norm’ in 
exercising an ICC warrant. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the relationship is irretrievable or that the 
ICC cannot continue to work in a productive manner across Africa. There are plenty of commentators, such as 
Imoedemhe (2015: 74), who believe ‘the relationship is still salvageable and could be enhanced for the mutual 
benefit of both institutions with a view to achieving the goal of peace and security’.  
One way in which the ICC and African Union might be able to develop a more positive relationship is, 
somewhat counterintuitively, through the empowerment of the African court to try those crimes associated 
with the ICC. In support of this, du Plessis et al. (2016: 12) argue that ‘there could be a valid role for the 
African Court, given the right political and financial support’, particularly if the court were to work closely 
with the ICC. One route for negotiating this could be through greater dialogue around what constitutes the 
principle of complementarity and the application of this in practice. For du Plessis et al. (2016: 7), properly 
and clearly articulated complementarity can be a principle through which the ICC and the African Union 
come to a shared understanding, and thus:  
 
Rather than perceiving the ICC as an instrument of global or universal (in)justice disrespectful 
of particularly African states’ sovereignty, the very premise of complementarity allows African 
states to demand that the ICC defers to their competence and right to investigate international 
crimes.  
 
The ICC faces a difficult role, dealing not only with cases in the aftermath of violence, but often cases 
occurring as part of ongoing conflict. These conflicts are complicated sociopolitical events, involving 
competing domestic, regional and at times international parties. It is not the job of the ICC to prevent or 
interrupt such conflict. While there is some truth in accusations of an overbalance from the ICC to countries in 
Africa, this does not mean that ‘the ICC needs to stop investigating and prosecuting crimes in Africa, but that 
it needs to also investigate and prosecute crimes elsewhere’ (Bassiouni and Hansen, 2014). An undue focus on 
African cases, perceived or real, does not de facto diminish the impact of the ICC’s work. The mandate of the 
ICC, however, remains tainted in the African context. In part, this is because of a difficult relationship 
between the ICC and the African Union, in part because of ongoing perceptions of a tendentious focus 
towards Africa, and in part because of criticisms around the suitability of applying an international justice 
approach in transitional contexts. For as long as these issues remain unresolved, the ICC will continue to face 
significant challenges when pursuing its work in Africa.  
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